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Resumen
En medio de un conflicto armado aún existente, Colombia asume hoy un proceso 
de transición hacia la paz, dotado de herramientas tanto  legales y judiciales, como 
extrajudiciales y políticas. Un modelo de justicia alternativa para el procesamiento 
de excombatientes, un proceso de desarme y  desmovilización en curso y una ley 
para garantizar la verdad, la justicia y la reparación a las víctimas, son algunos de los 
mecanismos con los cuales se busca la creación de escenarios de reconciliación nacional. 
Las falencias del proceso, sin embargo, se acentúan en la falta de estabilidad y seguridad 
jurídica en el procesamiento judicial de los excombatientes de bajo rango, sumidos en un 
limbo jurídico permanente que les impide la adecuada reinserción social.  Es obligatorio 
evidenciar la gravedad de este fenómeno, teniendo en cuenta que es precisamente la 
reintegración, el proceso con el cual concluye definitivamente el ciclo de violencia y se 
generan garantías efectivas de no repetición.
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Abstract
Amidst an unceasing armed conflict, Colombia currently undertakes a process of 
transition towards peace, for which it is equipped with legal, judicial, extrajudicial, and 
political means. A model of alternative justice for the prosecution of ex-combatants; an 
active process of Disarmament and Demobilization; and a law to guarantee truth, justi-
ce, and reparations for victims of armed violence, are among the mechanisms available 
with which to seek the creation of the spaces appropriate for national reconciliation. 
However, this process has been accentuated by a lack of judicial stability and security 
in the legal prosecution of low-ranking ex-combatants, who, as a consequence, become 
permanently mired in a legal limbo that inhibits their necessary social reinsertion.  It is 
crucial to highlight the gravity of this phenomenon considering that it is precisely the 
process of Reintegration that can definitively conclude the endless cycle of violence and 
that can generate effective Guarantees of “Non-Repetition”. 
Keywords: demobilized, transitional justice, reintegration, law 1424/2010, guarantees 
of “Non-Repetition”.
 
Introduction
The current national context in Colombia with regard to the armed conflict is 
determined by the existence of a series of legal, political, judicial, and extrajudicial 
mechanisms whose purpose is the creation of spaces to enable durable peace and the non-
repetition of crimes in a hostile and unfavorable context, in which wanton and brutal 
violence is far from an end.
The official recognition of the Colombian internal armed conflict generated the 
necessity to enact more integral and structurally focused instruments that protect the 
rights of victims as well as promote the appropriate reintegration of ex-combatants. 
On one hand, the legislation of Law 1448 of 2011, otherwise known as the “Victim’s 
Law” (Ley de Víctimas), created various valuable institutional mechanisms for the material 
guarantee of the right to truth, justice, and reparations. On the other hand, numerous 
proposals to modify Law 975 of 2005, the Law of Justice and Peace (Ley de Justicia y 
Paz), including the proposition of the Law Framework for Peace, evidence a growing 
tendency towards the recognition of the flaws that plague existing measures and the fixing 
of these flaws through legislative means. 
With regard to Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), transition 
policy constitutes a series of provisions that cover all demobilized combatants, but that 
give differential treatment, according the category of the ex-combatant in question. This 
categorization is based on their rank within the organization in which they operated and 
on the type of crimes committed, and for each of these outlines a specific legal pathway 
for prosecution. In the case of ex-members of paramilitary organizations, there exist at 
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least two categories. The first is composed of leaders and mid-level officers that are guilty 
of crimes against humanity and follows legal procedure as defined in Law 975. The second 
category in question is composed of rank and file ex-combatants, demobilized since 
2003, who are guilty of conspiracy to break the law aggravated by their membership in a 
criminal organization, and for whom the legal pathway for prosecution has been unclear. 
To the contrary, the legal framework has been ambiguous, changing, and contradictory, 
made up of norms that are frequently created and abolished or modified. The last of 
these, Law 1424 of 2011, was submitted to a review of constitutionality and was declared 
constitutional, which gives some clarity to a visibly uncertain situation that is a direct 
cause of desertion and illegal re-arming. 
An adequate legislative design for demobilization that is clear, stable, inclusive, and 
that reinforces the rule of law, is imperative considering that the successful reinsertion of 
ex-combatants to civil life is a fundamental precondition for the creation of processes of 
reconciliation and social reconstruction. The point is especially salient as, in the words 
of Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, Colombia attempts to “repair the boat at high sea”. 
 
The aim of this article is to put in evidence the shortcomings of a potentially successful 
and prolific demobilization process, like Colombia’s, when the appropriate spaces for 
Reintegration are not created and the legal and social destiny of a group of ex-combatants 
that is determined to lay down their arms and believe in the system is left in limbo.
In order to do this, the first section gives a general summary of the long and intricate 
legal process proposed for the 19,000 plus low ranking demobilized combatants since 
2003 through the declaration of the constitutionality of Law 1424 in October of 2011. 
The second section is an evaluation of the current state of this issue and the challenges still 
presented by the existing legal framework, both of which have important consequences 
for guarantees of non-repetition and of a durable peace for the country.
 
I. The legal pathway for demobilization in Colombia
A.  Law 418 of 1997 and Regulatory Decree 128 of 2003: the 
previous legal framework
The mass demobilization that occurred in the later half of 2003 under the legal 
framework of the peace process with paramilitary groups cast serious doubts as to its 
effectiveness. The existing norms in terms of negotiations and peace accords were, among 
others, Law 418 of 1997 and Regulatory Decree 128 of 2003, which authorized the 
national government to pursue peace negotiations with any illegal armed groups that 
satisfied a series of preconditions. These mandated that the group must have a clearly 
defined and recognized hierarchy, have the capacity to carry out and sustain military 
operations, and also that have the capacity to maintain control of territorial zones during 
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said military operations. Additionally, the two laws presupposed exemption, amnesty, 
cessation of the process, resolutions of preclusion or inhibitory resolutions for those that 
had not committed grievous crimes.
International Human Rights Law has emphatically prohibited any measure that 
hinders or avoids the prosecution of individuals that have committed grievous human 
rights violations, as this allows for impunity and makes impossible the indemnification of 
or reparations for victims and  is a detriment to national reconciliation1.
Given the impossibility of a policy of “pardon and forget” for ex-combatants that 
have committed grievous human rights crimes, the national government and Congress 
undertook the task of designing alternative ways to prosecute this specific group of 
demobilized individuals. This led to the creation of Law 975 of 2005 (also known as 
“The Law of Justice and Peace”), to deal with officers and leaders of armed groups, and 
included a continuity of the provisions defined by Law 783 for ex-combatants who were 
only under investigation for belonging to an illegal armed group.
B. First challenge: Supreme Court ruling of July 11, 2007
On July 11, 2007 the Colombian Supreme Court delivered the first ruling that would 
deny the possibility for the litigation of low-ranking ex-combatants under the provisions 
previously agreed upon. According to the Court’s decision, merely belonging to an illegal 
armed group implies the criminal offense of aggravated conspiracy to break the law, which 
is not the same as or comparable to the crime of sedition. Due to the fact that the former 
is not a political crime, it is not subject to amnesty, exemption, or any other exception of 
this kind, which would otherwise generate impunity. 
To accept that instead of conspiring to break the law the crime committed 
by the members of these paramilitary groups constitutes the punishable infraction 
denominated “sedition”, is not only equivalent to presupposing that these 
individuals acted with altruistic intentions in the collective interest, but also to 
disregarding the right of the victims and of society to justice and to the truth. 
In the case of the latter offense, the facts could remain obscured by the complete 
impunity –understood by the Interamerican Human Rights Court as a lack of 
investigation, pursuit, capture, prosecution and sentencing of those responsible for 
violations of the rights protected by the American Convention– given by amnesties 
and exemptions, both decisions made at the discretion of the Executive or Congress 
without judicial oversight, which would hinder the search for the complete truth, 
1 Data. UN, S/2004/616; International Human Rights Court: Velázquez  Rodríguez vs. Honduras (1988); Godínez 
Cruz vs. Honduras (1989);   Massacre of  Dos Erres vs. Guatemala (2009); Moiwana Community vs. Suriname (2007).
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the responsibility of  remembering, and the right to know with surety the facts of 
the case (Supreme Court, 2007: Proceso No. 26945).
For these reasons, and 
(…) according to the presented information, it is not possible, under any 
circumstance, to consider that the behavior displayed by the indicted fits in any 
way the description of a political crime. The actions of which Caballero Montalvo 
stands accused are simply to be considered common crimes. The crimes that the 
indicted is charged with are aggravated conspiracy to break the law and the illegal 
production, trafficking, and carrying of weapons legally exclusive to use in the 
military (Supreme Court, 2007: Proceso No. 26945).
The above, established with the aim of assuring effective guarantees for the rights of 
victims, generated, in practice, great inconsistencies regarding the legal protection and the 
proportionality of sentences for perpetrators. While low-ranking ex-combatants would be 
prosecuted under regular criminal law to serve ten year sentences for conspiracy to break 
the law, those officers and leaders of illegal armed groups responsible for crimes against 
humanity would serve reduced sentences, under the stipulations of Law 975 of 2005, of 
only eight years. 
C. Principle of Opportunity for the demobilized: Law 1312 of 
2009
These conditions generated mistrust for the process amongst those seeking to 
demobilize. According to the data of the High Ministry for Reintegration, by December 
of 2009, there were 52,226 demobilized ex-combatants, 31,671 were part of collective 
demobilizations and 20,555 individual (ACR, 2011).  The second report of the National 
Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation (Comisión Nacional de Reparación 
y Reconciliación, CNRR), “Reintegration: Achievements amidst rearmaments and 
unresolved issues”, indicates that an important percentage of members of the nascent 
illegal armed groups, denominated Criminal Bands (Bandas Criminales or Bacrim), are 
ex-members of paramilitary groups. According to the report, 
(…) it has been established that at least 17% of the members of said illegal 
armed groups are ex-members of the AUC paramilitary organization (Autodefensas 
Unidas de Colombia). Although this is a minority percentage, it is composed of 
ex-national, regional, and front bosses as well as of instructors and personnel with 
military experience. This minority percentage constitutes a considerable military 
potential, and, in many cases, a political and economic potential as well, to the 
point that some have been key factors of the new paramilitary phenomenon.
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This phenomenon, inevitably associated with the lack of confidence in a changing 
process with insufficient guarantee of security, has generated a constant worry, which, in 
turn, led the national government and Congress to create a series of alternative measures 
for judicial processing. In October of 2008, Congress contemplated the possibility of 
prosecuting the “group of 19,000” (the name given to the group of low-ranking ex-
combatants) under the Principle of Opportunity.
Law 906 of 2004 institutes and defines the Principle of Opportunity as that apparatus 
of criminal policy that enables the National Attorney’s Office to “suspend, interrupt, or 
renounce the pursuit of punitive prosecution”, given a series of grounds for such actions 
established in the same law (art. 323 and on). In general terms, this has to do with the 
power, held by the National Attorney’s Office, or whichever body acts in the capacity of 
plaintiff in these cases, to decline to initiate or continue with a criminal case for reasons 
of convenience and in certain specific instances. 
For example, someone who is a minor link of the larger chain of a criminal 
organization can collaborate in order to dismantle said organization in exchange 
for not being prosecuted. This is based on the hypothesis that it could result more 
beneficial for the State not to prosecute, giving impunity to the lesser criminal, in 
order to capture and bring to justice the officers and leaders of the same criminal 
organization (Reyes, 2008).
The application of this principle in such cases implies that though the State would 
initiate criminal investigations of each and every demobilized ex-combatant, it could 
decline to further pursue these cases with the end goal of contributing to peace and to the 
reintegration of these individuals to society, given that they would be complying with a 
set of commitments to the rights of victims to the truth, justice, and integral reparation.
On June 15 of 2009, through law 1312 of the same year, Congress approved a reform 
of the Principle of Opportunity that would include the application of this principle to 
low-ranking ex-combatants.
D. Unconstitutionality of number 17, article 2, Law 1312 of 2009: 
Sentence C-936 of 2010
On November 23 of 2010, nevertheless, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional 
number 17, article 2 of this law, reasoning that its application precluded the possibility of 
ensuring the protection of the rights of victims to the truth, justice, and reparation, and 
that it grievously violated the principle of legality of the Rule of Law. 
The Constitutional Court found that the power of reform of the legislative branch 
reaches its limits in matters such as those in which the State is legally obligated by 
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International Human Rights Law, International Criminal Law, and International 
Humanitarian Law, because 
(…) the violations of human rights and of International Humanitarian Law 
are much graver and more unacceptable than those offenses committed in other 
forms of criminality, due to the inherent implications for and effects on the human 
dignity of these. For these reasons, the Colombian State has united itself with the 
international community in the effort to sanction these conducts. The gravity of 
these behaviors exceeds the impassable limit of human dignity, in such a way that, 
for reasons of proportionality and of respect for its international commitments, 
the legislative branch could not forego criminal prosecution in these cases 
(Constitutional Court, C-095/07, C. J. 6.2.3.5.1).
For the same reasons the Court concluded:
(…) the denial of the State to investigate and sanction those crimes that 
grievously affect human dignity is unacceptable as an expression of the criminal 
prosecution policy of the State. Such procedure is inadmissible, in apparent or real 
states of transition to peace, whether under the criteria of political convenience 
or public utility. The absence of investigation and sanctioning of this type of 
crimes translates to a disregard for the rights of victims to access effective judicial 
protections, and, through this, access to the truth, justice, and integral reparations. 
Such procedure also violates the international obligations of the State –customary 
and conventional– to investigate, indict, try and sentence the perpetrators of 
grievous human rights violations, crimes against humanity, and war-crimes, which 
sets the stage for the chronic repetition of these conducts (Constitutional Court, 
C-093/10, C. J. 63).
This conclusion of the Court created a need to establish a definitive legal framework 
that would resolve in an urgent fashion the situation of the thousands of demobilized 
individuals awaiting litigation and that would dissuade them from continuing to commit 
criminal acts. Again, the future of the “group of 19,000” remained uncertain and at the 
mercy of the ability of the State to quickly yet definitively resolve their legal situation.
E. “The Accord for Contribution to Historical Truth and 
Reparation”: Law 1424 of 2010 and Regulatory Decree 2601 
of 2011
On December 16, 2010, fifteen days following this urgent call to the national 
government to resolve the situation, Senate project 202 and House project 149 were 
approved, both with the aim of once and for all clarifying the legal status of the demobilized 
of low rank. With the purpose of giving “provisions of transitional justice that guarantee 
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truth, justice, and reparation to the victims of demobilized members of illegal armed 
groups”, Law 1424 of 2010 states the following.
Table 1
Content of Law 1424 of 2010
Obligations of the 
demobilized 
The new functions of 
the Center for Historical 
Memory 
Access to Information
To be active or to formally 
end the reintegration process 
that is being led by the High 
Ministry for Reintegration 
(Alta Consejería Presidencial 
para la Reintegración, 
ACR). 
To collect, classify, 
systematize, analyze, and 
preserve the information that 
emerges from the Acuerdos 
de Contribución a la Verdad 
Histórica y la Reparación 
defined in the law, as well 
as the information that 
is received, individually 
and collectively, by the 
demobalized combatants 
who have signed the Acuerdo 
de Contribución a la Verdad 
Histórica y la Reparación 
and those persons who 
voluntarily wish to make a 
statement about those issues 
which pertain to or are of 
an interest to the truth and 
historical memory. 
All State entities, by 
virtue of the principle of 
coordination, will collaborate 
with the Centro de Memoria 
Histórica in order to 
accomplish its purposes. 
They must also offer any 
and all information they 
have at their disposal which 
relates to the Acuerdo de 
Contribución a la Verdad 
Histórica y la Reparación 
that the Law address, except 
when said information is 
confidential.
To not commit any 
crimes subsequent to 
demobilization.
To sign agreements, 
contracts, and all other legal 
acts that are necessary for 
the execution of its funtions 
and the develepment of its 
mandate.   
The Centro de Memoria 
Histórica  will be able to 
solicit the National Agency 
for Justice and Peace 
(Unidad Nacional para la 
Justicia y la Paz), of the 
National Attorneys Office, 
the documentation and 
information that is found 
in the legal phase with the 
purpose of contributing to 
the progressive construction 
of historical memory that 
guarantees the right to truth, 
justice, reparations, and non-
repetition. 
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To sign a document which 
commits them to contribute 
to truth, history and 
reparation. The period to 
sign this accord expires on 
December 28th of this year. 
By not signing, they forfeit 
the possibility of accessing 
the benefits of the Law. 
To produce periodical 
general reports that inform 
Colombian society of its 
advancement. These reports 
will be published and 
distributed by the media 
that is most conducive to 
reaching all of Colombian 
society.  
To participate in the social 
service and reparation 
activities that are established 
by the Alta Consejería 
Presidencial para la 
Reintegración. 
To sign the Accord for 
Historical Truth and 
Reparations before the Alto 
Consejero Presidencial para 
la Reintegración.   
To present themselves before 
the Mecanismo no Judicial 
de Contribución a la Verdad 
y la Memoria Histórica, 
where they should provide 
a clarification as to the 
structure of the illegal armed 
groups, the general context 
of their participation, and a 
guarantee that they will not 
repeat any violent acts.    
Source: “Constitutional Court clarifies the Law of the demobilized”. 
Revista Semana, October 13, 2011. 
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1.6 Charge of Unconstitutionality of Law 1424 of 2010: Press 
Release No. 41 of 2011 (Sentence C-771 of 2011)
On April 14, 2011, The Attorney’s Collective José Alvear Restrepo and congressmen 
Germán Talero and Iván Cepeda declared various parts of Law 1424 of 2010 as 
unconstitutional as they ignore and so seriously affect the rights of victims. In the first 
of three charges, they adduce that applying mechanisms of transitional justice to the 
simple or aggravated crime of conspiring to break the law “ignores the responsibility 
of the State to investigate, judge, and sanction human rights violations, crimes against 
humanity, and violations of International Humanitarian Law”. In the second they state 
that the prohibition of the use of the Accord for Contribution to Historical Truth and 
Reparation in lawsuits against those who have undersigned it or third parties, also 
violates the right to truth, justice, and reparation of the victims of confessed crimes. In 
the last, they claim that the inadmissibility of the court order that communicates to the 
parties of the process the ex-combatant arrest warrant is a violation of victims rights to 
justice and due process.
On October 13 of 2011, the Supreme Court passed a ruling on the charges in 
question and declared Law 1424 constitutional. In response to the first charge, the 
Court reasoned that the reach of the rights of victims is not universal and is subject to 
exceptional circumstances as in the application of measures of transitional justice. In this 
sense, constitutionality should be consonant with the applicable model of justice, with 
the aim of generating the spaces to ensure the guarantee of rights and reconciliation.
The Court’s ruling accepted that Law 1424 is a norm of transitional justice and, 
for this reason, did not agree that the inclusion of the simple or aggravated crime of 
conspiring to break the law within the category of crimes whose perpetrators are eligible 
to be processed under this norm, be it a violation of the responsibility to investigate, try, 
and sentence such perpetrators. On the contrary, the Court established that 
(…) the application of the provisions of the law, that in this ruling have been 
explained, do not imply that the Colombian State must forego investigation and 
ruling in these cases, in particular, in the case of conspiracy to break the law, be it 
simple or aggravated. In fact, article 5 of this same mandate requires the existence 
of some judicial action within the framework of the law or, once the sentence given, 
that the conditional suspension of the fulfillment of the sentence that would have 
been imposed can be examined or not (Constitutional Court, 2011).
Many academics go even further in affirming that, in a transitional context, the 
prosecution of every individual involved in a war is impossible, and that it is not mandatory 
with respect to the international community, which has never established that conspiring 
to break the law is a crime against humanity or that it is a violation of human rights. 
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It is clear that international law requires States to investigate and punish grievous 
human rights violations and international crimes as established in the famous 
case of Velásquez-Rodríguez of Interamerican Human Rights Court. However, 
the Interamerican Court –and much less any other international authority– has 
never ruled that merely belonging to a criminal group constitutes a human rights 
violation (Ambos, 2011).
With respect to the second charge, the Court established that within the framework 
of a transition towards peace, the constitutional precepts that underlay this process, like 
the privilege against self-incrimination, must be respected. 
Therefore, to permit within the scope of transitional justice that the information 
provided by an ex-combatant not generate adverse consequences for them, 
moreover specifically within the context of Law 1424 of 2010, is not contrary to the 
Constitution and does, in fact, comply with the purpose of the State for it seeks to 
secure a durable peace, justice, truth, the indemnification of victims, and the social 
reinsertion of ex-members of illegal armed groups (Ambos, 2011).
This remains true for the case of close family members as well (as mentioned in article 
33 of the Constitution).
Finally concerning the third charge, the Court also ruled against the claimants 
considering that 
(…) this rule cannot be considered harmful to the interest of the victims, as the 
decision that the norms in question make not exceptionable is that of informing 
such persons about the request received, which far from harming them could even 
contribute to the defense of their interests. In fact, once notified of the presented 
request, and in the absence of any restriction present in the rules to this regard, those 
who feel affected by the measure of liberty requested by the government, could 
well deliver a writ or express themselves in some other way, asking the competent 
judicial authority to negate the benefit that would have been requested.
In this way, the rules in question were declared executable and are currently effective 
as the legal procedure for litigation in the case of low-ranking ex-combatants.
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In summary, the following has been the legal pathway for the demobilization of low-
ranking ex-combatants: 
Table 2
Law 418 of 
1997 (Extended 
by the Law 728 
of 2002 and the 
Law 1106 of 
2011) 
Ruling 11 of 
July, 2007, 
Supreme Court 
of Justice
Law 1312 of 
2009
Law 1424 of 
2010
Objective for 
creating the 
reglulation or 
ruling 
To authorize 
the National 
Government to 
grant pardons 
to low -ranking 
ex-combatants, 
who are 
considered 
perpetrators 
of political 
crimes for their 
membership in 
an illegal armed 
group. 
Additionally, to 
give authorize 
the legal 
power of the 
cessation of the 
proceedings, the 
resolution of the 
preclusion of 
the inhibitory 
resolution or 
resolution 
of said ex-
combatants 
who having 
been processed, 
confessed and 
still have not 
been convicted.
To establish that 
membership in 
an illegal armed 
group does 
not constiute a 
political crime.  
To declare that 
the membership 
does constitute 
the conspiracy 
to commit an 
aggravated 
crime, which 
cannot be 
subjected 
to amnesty, 
pardon, nor any 
measure of this 
nature. 
To establish 
as grounds for 
enforcement 
the Principle of 
Opportunity in 
the case of low 
-ranking ex- 
combatents that 
have willingly 
demonstrated 
their 
reconciliation 
for their 
reincorporation 
to society and 
to collaborate 
in dismanteling 
of the blocs and 
fronts of their 
illegal armed 
groups. 
To suspend 
the arrest 
warrant and the 
imprisonment 
of low-ranking 
demobilized 
combatants 
who signed the 
Acuerdos de 
Contribución 
a la Verdad 
Histórica y la 
Reparación. 
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Consequences 
Low -ranking 
ex-combatents 
remained 
classified 
as political 
criminals, 
which made 
it possible to 
process them 
through  the 
measures of 
amnesty and 
pardon.
Low-ranking 
ex-combatents 
lost  their 
classification 
as political 
criminals and 
would be 
processed  by 
ordinary courts 
for conspiracy 
to commit an 
aggravated 
crime which 
carries a charge 
of 6-10 years in 
prison. 
It would 
have initiated 
a criminal 
investigation 
for aggravated 
conspiracy to 
break the law, 
but it would 
have applied 
the Principle of 
Opportunity 
once the 
demobilized 
combatent 
demonstrated 
their 
willingness to 
collaborate and 
commitment to 
peace. 
This law was 
determined
unconstitutional 
by the ruling 
C-936 of 2010. 
 
A  criminal 
investigation is 
carried out and 
the demobilized 
combatent is 
convicted, but 
they can enjoy 
their freedom, 
as long as 
they have not 
committed a 
crime after their 
demobilization 
and have 
contributed to 
the historical 
memory and the 
reparations for 
the victims. 
This law was 
determined 
unconstitutional 
by the 
Constitutional 
Court. 
 
Sourse: created by the author.
II. Legislation on demobilization in Colombia: the current 
panorama and topics of debate
As has been argued in this article, Colombian criminal prosecution policy with regard 
to demobilization has been diverse and inconsistent. Those who avail to Law 975 of 
2005 face a long and cumbersome process. The rest have been subjected to uncertain and 
temporary procedures that contrast sharply with the pacts and promises made prior to 
their demobilization and make trusting in the process virtually impossible.
The above has not been far removed from the attention of the public authorities and 
of the consciousness of civil society, which in the long run assumes the consequences, 
positive or negative, of achieving peace, remaining at war, or being lost in transition. 
In the rushed search for alternative solutions, the State has created a heterogeneous and 
improvised set of legal tools, which are sometimes even contradictory, in an attempt to end 
the controversy surrounding the issue and has shown its incapacity to outline a clear and 
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consistent direction towards achieving reconciliation and durable peace. This unnecessary 
legal inflation has created precisely that which it sought to avoid: polemics, conflicts of 
interest, confusion, but, above all, a growing mistrust among those who would lay down 
arms in the legal and political institutions leading to their return to delinquent activities.
A. The model for transitional justice in Colombia
One of the clearest structural flaws with regard to peace in Colombia can be found, 
without a doubt, in its model of transitional justice. The Colombian context is singular in 
its kind, in which war and peace conflate in the same protagonists, the same victims, and 
the same spaces. Those who support peace remain alongside those who continue to insist 
on war, and the victims of innumerable counts of violence must continue to live alongside 
those who have recently laid down arms, without a previous process to ease into sharing 
space and to work out forgiveness and reconciliation.
Transitional justice is a model that applies in contexts of transition towards democracy 
and peace. It is defined as 
(…) all the varieties of processes and mechanisms associated with the attempts 
of a society to resolve the problems derived from a past of large-scale violence and 
violations, with the purpose of holding the perpetrators of abuses accountable for 
their acts, serving justice, and achieving reconciliation. Such mechanisms can be 
judicial or extrajudicial and can have varying levels of international participation 
(or forego it completely). Some examples include, legal prosecution of individuals, 
reparations, the search for truth, institutional reform, delving into personal 
histories, removal of charges, and, of course, different combinations of all these 
(UN, S/2004/616 III Para. 8).
As has been signaled throughout this article, the international community has been 
emphatic in maintaining that all processes of transition should be conducted with a 
strong focus on the respect for human rights, especially for the rights of victims to truth, 
justice, and integral reparations.
This debate has been central to the creation of laws for peace in Colombia. According 
to the report of the Secretary General of the UN titled, “The Rule of Law and the justice 
of transition in societies that suffer or have suffered conflicts”, 
(…) justice and peace are not opposing forces; when they are constructed 
appropriately, they promote and sustain each other mutually. It follows then that 
the question can never be whether or not to seek justice and accountability, but 
rather when and how to do so (UN, 2004: Consideration No. 21).
Nevertheless, in cases such as Colombia’s, the concepts of justice and peace seem to 
exclude and contradict each other, and so laws like the Law of Justice and Peace are 
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enacted, which have conciliatory focuses and that attempt to guarantee the rights of 
victims to truth, justice, and reparations and at the same time guarantee the right of ex-
combatants to be reincorporated to civil society. Such laws attempt to encompass much 
more than what in political, judicial, and legal practice is possible. These laws, like Law 
975 of 2005, propose a formula that is as eclectic as unenforceable or, as in the example 
of Law 1424 of 2010, aspire to process with illusory swiftness each of the total 126,000 
demobilized low-ranking combatants involved in the peace process.
This provides strong evidence of the structural flaws of the transitional justice system 
in the country. We apply alternative forms of legal processing for ex-combatants in return 
for a fundamental contribution to durable peace, but criminal prosecution policy clearly 
remains punitive. In the words of Kai Ambos, 
(…) what we find is the development from a minimal criminal law, of última 
ratio, towards a maximal criminal law, of prima ratio, a displacement of the classic 
protective function of human rights faced with the repressive criminal law of the 
authoritarian State and a proactive and aggressive function for human rights, 
seeking to protect them through the criminalization of violators (2011). 
This position, while viable as a criminal prosecution policy in a normal context, is 
unsustainable in a context such as Colombia’s, in which there is neither the logistical 
capacity nor the adequate state structure to administer justice to the full extent required 
by Law 1424.
The full extent of Law 1424 requires the legal processing of each individual that has 
demobilized, meaning that each ex-combatant has until December 28, 2011, to comply 
with the proper authorities. For this to happen, the National Attorney’s Office must open 
more than 126,000 cases of aggravated conspiracy to break the law, which also requires 
the previous signature of the ex-combatant of the Accord for Contribution to Historical 
Truth and Reparation with the High Ministry for Reintegration. Finally, after this is 
complete, the National Attorney’s Office must also suspend the orders for capture of all 
those in compliance under the provisions of article 6 of this law.
Obviously, the swiftness and success of these actions are only a utopian desire.
Everyone with a realistic perspective knows that these demands cannot possibly 
be fulfilled by the Colombian criminal justice system, nor, in fact, by any justice 
system in the world. It is purely a symbolic law, with which we return to the 
infamous attitudes of the colonial agents of the past, “I’ll obey, but I won’t carry 
out”, and so graphically illustrate the classic divorce between the law and reality in 
Latin America (Ambos, 2011).
Considered with all the above, the possibility that all those ex-combatants called to 
register themselves with the High Ministry for Reintegration do so is very small. 
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Subtracting the 15,000 guerillas and the 13,000 that aren’t covered by the 
provisions of the law, Law 1424 really targets the 26,000 ex-paramilitaries. The 
first problem is that nobody has any idea about where a great portion of them are 
(…). Currently, the High Ministry for Reintegration (ACR), directed by Eder, has 
registered as active in the process of reintegration a total of 16,000 ex-paramilitaries. 
The rest, 10,000 more, are, more or less, lost: 6,400 register as “inactive”, that is to 
say that ACR knows who they are, but that they are not participating in the program 
and their whereabouts are unknown. The remaining 4,000 never registered (Revista 
Semana, October 2011).
It is apparent, then, that the authorities have little more than two months to 
undertake the search for the ex-combatants that still have not registered, and these same 
ex-combatants have the same amount of time to be convinced to submit themselves to 
the law, amidst the serious doubts that surround the demobilization process.
B.  What reintegration means
Lastly, the current situation of low-ranking ex-combatants raises the problem 
associated with their reintegration to civil life. Even for those who do sign the agreement 
as the law requires, reinsertion to the labor market will be very difficult. According to 
the Law 1424, the serving of their sentence will be suspended, but their incimination as 
perpetrators of conspiracy to break the law will remain on their Criminal Record, which 
will largely reduce their chances of being hired by potential employers. 
In Colombia, the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintigration –DDR– process 
has placed a special emphasis on the first two parts of the process and ignored the third. 
The data which shows the thousands of combatents that demobilize annually and the 
number of arms that are turned-in, sharply contrasts with the number of ex-combatents 
who participate in reintegration programs. This is consistent with the elevated rates of 
desertion and the alarming outbreak of rearmament and generalized violence. At the same 
time, it is important to note that the Reintegration process is without a doubt the most 
delicate and complicated of the three.
(…) reintegration is directly related to peaceful coexistence and social 
reconciliation. Neither of these constructive processes  can be imposed, rather they 
must be developed in a interdependent and dynamic manner. This requires the 
cooperation of an entire society in order to succeed. All of the aforementioned 
signifies that reintegration is the most important factor in long-term stability and 
peace (Springer, 2005).
Reintegration implies nothing less than reliable guarantees of non-repetition for the 
victims, durable peace, and coexistence among old enemies. It also implies the difficult 
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route of legality over many other possible routes that are less risky and more lucrative, but 
that are also illegal. 
When a combatent joins an armed group, they are generally abandoning 
conditions in which they had nothing to lose. Many combatants have formed 
families and made community into the cornerstone of their livelihood after their 
involvement with these armies, not before (Springer, 2005).
In the words of Néstor Raúl Correa, there exists in Colombia a dilemma between the 
needs demanded by reparations of the victims and the importance for reintegration. 
Within the scope of this internal armed conflict and the processes of reinsertion, 
the question of the rights of the victims arises in order to resolve the tension 
between the concessions given to the reinserted ex-combatents and the obligation to 
compensate the victims. Between reinsertion and reparation lies the dilemma. On 
the side of reinsertion, transitional justice demands that reasonable concessions are 
made to armed groups that demobilize, given that they were not crushed militarily 
or politically but were offered a path toward peace. On the side of reparation, 
the individuals who have been victims of the violation of rights established by 
international and internal standards have the right to integral reparations (2007).
In response to these various needs, it is fundamental to consider that the reintegration 
process implies a complexity that requires interdisciplinary approaches. One approach 
focuses on the reconstruction of identity and morals on the part of the individual who 
is received by the community, while the other approach focuses, if not on full pardon, 
at least on peaceful coexistence and cooperation with those who receive them. To make 
this possible, the State must generate some basic conditions to build trust in the process. 
“The ex-combatent needs to believe that promises will be fulfilled, that the communities 
selected for their relocation will be prepared to receive and integrate them, and that their 
personal security will be relatively guaranteed” (Springer, 2005). 
As is shown, the Colombian context is that of a legal route which is unreliable, unstable, 
and uncertain, which diminishes the possibilities for trust in the process. Moreover, if 
the legal framework has been confusing, the measures for involving communities in the 
transition have neem no better. The existing programs are reduced to local initiatives 
and do not involve civil society as a whole to decide on its options for building peace. 
Neither the legal, the political, nor the social measures implemented have fostered 
favorable environments for adequate for reintegration. This has resulted in a growing rate 
of desertion from the reintegration process and the creation of new illegal armed groups 
that perpetuate the same violence. 
The country still has many obstacles to overcome in the design and implementation 
of its formula for peace. It must come to terms with the victims, who day-by-day suffer 
the indifference of a State that still does not recognize their pain. It must deal with the 
excombatents, who gradually find their willful participation in peace processes gradually 
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eroded by contradictory, unstable, and harmful legislation and so decide to forego remorse 
and return to a world of violence. Finally it must attend to civil society, which navigates 
between polemics and absurdity, adrift without any certainty for when transition will 
come to an end.
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